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There and Back Again: The Making of Uganda’s Mobile Money Tax 
 




This paper evaluates the appropriateness of the tax policymaking process that led to the 
introduction, and the later adaptation, of a tax on mobile money transactions in Uganda in 
2018. We examine the unusual source of the proposal, how this particular tax diverged from 
the usual tax policymaking process, and whether certain key stakeholders were excluded. 
We argue that weaknesses in the tax policymaking process undermined the quality of policy 
design, and resulted in a period of costly, and avoidable, policy adjustment. This case study 
is relevant for Uganda as well as for other low-income countries which could be exposed to 
similar challenges in designing effective taxes for the mobile money industry.  
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Mobile money is one of the most prominent and powerful financial sector innovations of the 
past decade for low-income countries, particularly in East Africa (Suri 2017). The service 
enables mobile phone users to deposit, transfer, and withdraw cash without having access to 
a traditional bank account. Initially dominated by inter-person transfers, the service has 
expanded to include a wide range of other payment capabilities, including utility bills, taxes, 
licences, and retail, and several governments have experimented with using mobile money to 
facilitate social transfers (Aron 2018). More recently, there have been a number of financial 
innovations using mobile money to deliver other products, such as microcredit and loans. A 
growing body of empirical studies have documented the potential benefits of the expansion 
of mobile money, including accelerating financial inclusion, increasing savings mobilisation 
and consumption, and improving resilience to shocks by reducing the transaction costs 
involved in domestic remittances (Jack and Suri 2016, 2014; Aron 2018; Munyegera and 
Matsumoto 2016; Riley 2018). 
 
As the sector, and its turnover, has grown, governments are increasingly viewing mobile 
money as a convenient tax handle.1 This is especially true for governments facing pressures, 
both domestic and external, to increase domestic revenue mobilisation and reduce the 
reliance on aid and borrowing to fund public services. The resulting tax measures are often 
controversial and have drawn sharp criticism from those who fear that they will undermine 
the growth of nascent digital finance sectors and the development gains that (digital) financial 
inclusion is claimed to enable (Adegoke 2018; Ndung’u 2019; UNCDF 2018). 
 
Uganda presents an interesting case study of this trend. On 1 July 2018, the government 
introduced an especially contentious new tax of 1 per cent on the value of all mobile money 
transactions. This formed one part of a package of excise duty amendments looking to 
mobilise more revenue from the telecommunications and financial sectors, including a new 
and unpopular charge of UGX 200 (US$ 0.052) per day to access social media3 and 
increased tax rates on the fees charged by mobile money providers and financial institutions 
(Government of Uganda 2018a).4 The mobile money tax legislation was initially drafted such 
that every stage of a mobile money transfer was taxed – depositing, sending, receiving, and 
withdrawing the money. These were identified as separate, and thus individually taxable, 
transactions. In effect, one transfer between two users might have been taxed up to four 
times. After widespread public outcry and significant challenges in implementation, the tax 
rate was adjusted to 0.5 per cent and restricted to withdrawals in November 2018. 
 
What was the origin of this ultimately flawed measure? What did the policymaking process 
look like? Were established policy processes bypassed or undermined? Who was involved 
and who was excluded?  
 
These are the key questions we seek to answer in this paper. This paper examines and 
critiques the tax policymaking process followed during the introduction, and the later 
adaptation, of the mobile money tax. Through this case study, we highlight the risks posed by 
shortcomings in Uganda’s current approach to tax policymaking. A well-engineered process 
 
1 A ‘tax handle’ typically refers to a part of the economic system to which taxes can be attached.  
2 1 US Dollar equates to approximately 3,700 Ugandan Shillings (UGX) (based on the average exchange rate in 2019). 
This exchange rate is used throughout the paper. 
3 The Excise Duty Act in Uganda (see Government of Uganda 2018a) applies this tax to ‘over the top services’, which are 
defined in the Act as ‘the transmission or receipt of voice or messages over the internet protocol network and includes 
access to virtual private networks’. In this context, the tax is applied to apps allowing instant messaging, video calling, 
and voice calling, which have replaced traditional phone calls and text messaging services.  
4 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a full breakdown of the tax changes introduced through the Excise Duty Amendment 
Bill 2018 (Parliament of Uganda 2018a). 
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does not guarantee good outcomes. However, we will argue that by establishing a few key 
fundamentals, governments can make the achievement of better policy outcomes more 
likely, and significantly decrease the risk of avoidable, often costly, errors in policy design. 
The relevance of this work extends beyond Uganda, as other low-income countries are 
considering introducing, or are experimenting with, taxes on mobile money services, and 
digital payments more generally. We expect this work to be of interest to policymakers facing 
similar challenges, particularly in the context of political regimes characterised by strong 
vertical accountability and patrimonial governance.  
 
This paper contributes to two strands of literature: the study of tax policymaking; and 
analyses of the taxation of digital financial services. In the first strand, the process of 
designing, drafting, scrutinising, and implementing tax laws is relatively under-examined, 
particularly in the context of low- and middle-income countries. Wales and Wales (2012) give 
the most comprehensive and systematic comparative study of the entire lifecycle of tax policy 
development, across ten high-income countries. The authors find that, in general, the 
importance of a properly functioning tax policy process is under-appreciated and under-
resourced, with too little emphasis placed on engaging citizens on tax policy issues, 
weakening links between taxation and representation (Wales and Wales 2012). 
 
Many of these issues are heightened in lower-income countries. Dedicated tax policy units, 
where they exist, tend to be constrained by the availability of reliable data and the capacity of 
staff to analyse this data, in addition to having relatively little specialised training on tax 
issues (Grote 2017). This can be complicated further by institutional rivalry between the 
authority responsible for revenue collection and those responsible for policy development 
(often housed in a ministry of finance). Revenue authorities hold the data and practical 
knowledge necessary for well-designed policy and commonly report to ministers of finance, 
but also derive significant bargaining power from their role in funding the state (Moore, 
Fjeldstad, Isaksen, Lundstøl, McCluskey and Prichard 2015; Arnold 2013). With respect to 
stakeholder engagement, the literature supports wide consultation to minimise damaging 
consequences and compliance burdens and to foster a sense of ownership and political buy-
in (Gordon and Thuronyi 2012; Wales and Wales 2012). However, tax reform in low-income 
countries tends to involve just a few trusted and well-informed experts (Arnold 2013). The 
empowerment of a wide range of voices in public tax debates is rare in the African context 
(Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad 2018). Finally, research thus far has demonstrated the 
importance of strong institutions for successful tax reform, as these help to guard against 
opportunistic behaviour by developing reliable analysis in support of a well-articulated 
strategy (Cottarelli 2012).5 
 
The second strand of literature is emergent, with only a few instances of papers examining 
the rationale for and impact of taxes on digital financial services, especially mobile money 
services, in lower-income countries. Clifford (2020) examines the motivations behind and 
‘unintended consequences’ of mobile money taxation in Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic 
of Congo, and Malawi through a largely qualitative approach based on semi-structured 
interviews. The author finds that the driving force has often been a desire to increase tax 
collection, as well as tackle perceived evasion in the informal sector by taxing a favoured 
payment method. Clifford (2020) argues that, as there are no tax-free thresholds and few 
alternatives for low-income earners (who typically do not have access to the formal banking 
system), these taxes are, by design, regressive. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the 
livelihoods of mobile money agents have been affected as business slows. In addition, the 
author points to the depressed growth in mobile money transaction values post-tax, arguing 
that this will have negative implications for the corporate income and value-added tax bases, 
as the profitability of mobile money providers may be reduced (Clifford 2020). Ndung’u 
(2019) argues that the taxation of mobile-based transactions might threaten financial 
 
5 See Wales and Lees (2020) for a more detailed review of the literature in this area. 
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inclusion gains, increase incentives to use cash to avoid taxation, and may be 
(mis)interpreted as the government actively discouraging the use of these services. The 
author examines trends in the growth of electronic payments in Kenya, noting that growth in 
the share of electronic payments made using mobile phones appeared to slow after a new 
excise duty was introduced in 2013. While the author acknowledges that this is rather weak 
empirical evidence, it is taken as a sign that higher tax rates discourage use, especially 
among cost-sensitive low-income earners, resulting in lower tax collection over time. Finally, 
Fuchs, Musuku and Symington (2017) study mobile money taxes in Pakistan and Tanzania 
through stakeholder interviews and focus-group discussions with customers and agents. The 
authors find that taxes were unlikely to have influenced demand for person-to-person (P2P) 
transfers, as the total tax burden was small (1–2 per cent of the amount transferred) 
compared to other transaction costs and there are few outside options. However, they also 
argue that taxes might discourage the broad adoption of more ‘advanced’ uses of mobile 
money, such as merchant payments and mobile credit. While these papers are suggestive of 
negative implications for the broader economy, financial inclusion, market deepening, and 
the welfare of low-income earners, they are not conclusive. There is a dearth of rigorous 
empirical work, for instance using administrative tax or mobile money user data, in-depth 
field surveys, or ‘lab-in-the-field’ experiments,6 to capture the true impact of these taxes. 
 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by examining, in detail, a specific example of the 
tax policymaking process in a low-income country. To our knowledge, this is one of the only 
papers to take such an approach. We also complement a recent review of the tax 
policymaking process in Uganda by Wales and Lees (2020), which examined the overall 
effectiveness of current practices and working arrangements (discussed in section 2). Our 
exposition of the current process establishes a benchmark against which to evaluate the 
case of the mobile money tax. In section 3, we explore in detail the motivations for the 
introduction of the tax, making links to the political dynamics at the time. We describe how 
this case diverged from the typical tax policy process in Uganda, indicating in section 4 what 
made this particular measure highly unusual. Finally, in section 5 we suggest possible 
remedial actions and give some policy recommendations to safeguard and strengthen the 
policymaking process. 
 
Importantly, this paper does not attempt to conduct a thorough evaluation of the broader 
social and economic impact of the tax measure itself. This would require a robust empirical 
analysis of more granular data, to determine the impact on the users and usage of mobile 
money, financial inclusion, and economic well-being. To our knowledge, such a study has not 
yet been done, although we are planning to undertake such research in the coming months.7 
Instead, the objective of this paper is to identify where the tax policy process diverged from 




6 These studies combine elements of both lab and field experiments. Like field experiments, they are usually conducted in 
the theoretically relevant population and setting, but by incorporating tools used in lab experiments, the researcher 
maintains tighter control. They are used to understand ‘preferences in the wild’ (Gneezy and Imas 2017). 
7 Some working papers and reports have drawn conclusions about the consequences and impact of introducing the 
mobile money tax, however we see these as largely anecdotal and provisional, especially as the period examined post-
introduction is often fairly short and aggregate data is used, which can mask differences in impacts across various users 
and usage types. For instance, see Clifford (2020), UNCDF (2018), and Wesonga and Kyeyune (2018). 
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1  Study context and methodology 
 
1.1 The importance of mobile money in Uganda 
 
Mobile money services were first introduced in Uganda by MTN in 2009 and, since then, the 
sector has seen significant growth. During the first year of operation, the number of 
registered accounts grew to 770,000 and the total value of transactions amounted to 
approximately UGX 133 billion (US$ 36 million) over the year. After MTN, other mobile 
network operators (MNOs) soon introduced similar services and seven licences for mobile 
money services have subsequently been issued, although the industry is still dominated by 
MTN and Airtel.8  
 
Within a decade, the number of registered, active accounts had surpassed 16 million9 and 
the total annual value of transactions had grown to UGX 73 trillion (US$ 20 billion) (Bank of 
Uganda 2021). To put this into context, in 2019, Uganda’s working-age population was 22.8 
million10 and 57 people in every 100 had a mobile cellular subscription (World Bank 2020a). 
Figure 1.1 highlights the dramatic growth in the uptake and usage of mobile money accounts, 
which shows little sign of slowing. This growth is due, in part, to the accessibility of mobile 
money, enabled through a national network of roughly 212,500 registered mobile money 
agents11 who are markedly more prevalent than more traditional financial service providers, 
such as commercial banks. Surveys have indicated that whereas 54 per cent of the 
population had a mobile money point-of-service within one kilometre of their home, just 16 
per cent of the population had a point-of-service for a traditional bank (Bank of Uganda 
2017). 
 
The rise of mobile money in Uganda correlates with expanded financial inclusion (Demirgüç-
Kunt, Klapper, Singer, Ansar and Hess 2018). The 2018 FinScope survey12 showed that the 
share of the adult population with access to an account from a formal provider, including 
mobile money operators and commercial banks, has almost doubled since 2009. Mobile 
money is by far the most popular formal service, with 56 per cent of adults using this, versus 
just 11 per cent using commercial bank services, the next most common (FSDU 2018). 
Recent empirical research indicates that mobile money plays an important role in the 
financial well-being of users. Usage has been linked to improved resilience of households in 
the face of shocks to income (Jack and Suri 2014) and increased household per capita 
consumption (Jack and Suri 2016; Munyegera and Matsumoto 2016). Increased remittances, 
and improved risk-sharing through a larger, more accessible network of family and friends, 
appear to improve consumption smoothing among mobile money users, relative to non-users 
(Jack and Suri 2014; Jack, Ray and Suri 2013; Munyegera and Matsumoto 2016; Riley 
2018). While the reliability of some of these socioeconomic impacts has been questioned 
(see, for instance, Bateman, Duvendack and Loubere (2019)), the financial inclusion of the 
poor seems more likely to have positive than negative effects, if not truly transformative 




8 NITA-U (National Information Technology Authority – Uganda) data (2018) indicates that among mobile phone owners, 
74 per cent use MTN as their service provider, and 62 per cent use Airtel (multiple selections are possible). 
9 For an account to be considered as ‘active’, it must have been used to perform at least one person-to-person payment, 
bill payment, cash in, cash out, or airtime top up during at least 90 days prior to the end of December 2019. At the end 
of 2019, Uganda’s mobile money sector reported over 27 million total registered accounts. 
10 This represents 52 per cent of the total population. 
11 As of December 2019 (Bank of Uganda 2021). 
12 This is a nationally representative survey conducted by the Finmark Trust in partnership with Financial Sector 
Deepening Uganda (FSDU). Similar surveys were conducted in 2007, 2009, and 2015. 
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This study is primarily qualitative in approach and many of our findings are based on 
interviews with senior government officials (principally at the Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development and the Uganda Revenue Authority) and other close observers 
with substantial experience of Ugandan tax policymaking. We also rely heavily on our own 
recollections of the policy process. These insights are complemented by textual analysis of 
publicly available government documents (including relevant legislation, parliamentary 
records, and government policies), academic articles, and newspaper reports. For our 
description of the current approach to tax policymaking in Uganda (see section 2), we draw 
on previous work from Wales and Lees (2020). Finally, we present some descriptive 
statistics data published by the Bank of Uganda (BOU) and data on tax revenue collection 
provided by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and the 
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA).  
 
 
2  The Ugandan tax policymaking process 
 
Uganda currently has the foundations of a strong, well-structured system for policy 
development, providing for an orderly progression from an idea for change to the 
implementation of a final tax measure (Wales and Lees 2020). Tax policy development in 
Uganda follows a series of distinct phases, closely linked to the annual budget cycle, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. This process has emerged through a combination of historical 
influences (it has similarities to Westminster practices), cultural norms, and Ugandan political 
requirements. In principle, the process gives longer-term strategic plans a role in guiding the 
development of the revenue strategy and allows for the early integration of external inputs. It 
incorporates elements of ‘best practice’ in tax policymaking, such as stakeholder 
consultation, analysis of revenue estimations for proposed measures, close working 
relationships with the legislature, and feedback loops (Wales and Wales 2012; Gordon and 
Thuronyi 2012; Arnold 2013). It also closely resembles New Zealand’s Generic Tax Policy 
Process (GTPP), which places significant emphasis on the early development of policy 
ideas, extensive consultation, intra-government collaboration, and post-implementation 
review (Tax Working Group 2018). The GTPP has been singled out as a particularly strong 
example of a tax policymaking process (Wales and Wales 2012). 
(a) Registered mobile money accounts (b) Transaction volumes and values 
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Figure 2.1 The Ugandan tax policymaking process 
 
Source: authors’ re-creation, from Wales and Lees (2020).  
 
In practice, however, certain phases are under-developed, truncated, or bypassed in the 
interests of political expediency. Below, we briefly describe the process followed by a typical 
tax measure, noting where current practices generally fall short of aspirations. This then 
serves as a baseline against which to assess the process in relation to the mobile money tax 
in section 3. We start with the planning phase, where the tax policy work really begins. Tax 
policymakers are typically less involved in the strategic phase (the grey shaded area in 
Figure 2.1), which is determined by other parts of the Government of Uganda (GOU). 
Mentions of taxation in these strategic plans are often limited to a target tax-to-GDP ratio, 





2.1 The planning phase 
 
Tax policy development is tightly controlled by the MFPED, which houses the Tax Policy 
Department (TPD) under the Directorate of Economic Affairs (Appendix Figure A1 shows an 
abbreviated organisational structure of MFPED). The MFPED has been recognised as a 
‘pocket of effectiveness’ within the GOU, as it is usually able to deliver on its mandate in a 
context where this is not the norm (Bukenya and Hickey 2019). The tax policy agenda in 
Uganda should, in theory, be reconciled with other key government strategies, such as the 
Vision 2040 and associated National Development Plans. In reality, the direct influence of 
other GOU strategies and policies on the revenue strategy is relatively slight (Wales and 
Lees 2020). Ensuring that tax policy is compatible with other government objectives is only 
done sporadically, and engagements between TPD and other parts of the GOU are usually 
limited and unstructured. 
 
TPD’s annual workplan is largely determined by the budget cycle, in terms of both timing and 
content. While this improves the predictability of work, TPD’s involvement in crafting the 
budget strategy is limited to providing a projection of tax revenues as an input for determining 
the resource envelope (Wales and Lees 2020). Partly as a result, the policy work is generally 
biased towards developing short-term, revenue-raising measures. Somewhat unusually, the 
development of the Domestic Revenue Mobilisation Strategy (DRMS), Uganda’s medium-
term revenue strategy, included several inputs from other ministries and other parts of the 
MFPED, facilitated through the establishment of the Domestic Revenue Mobilisation Working 
Group which brought together several other government bodies and private sector 
associations. This strategy recognises the importance of establishing a medium-term vision 
for tax policy and presents a valuable opportunity to redress the balance between short-term 
demands and medium-term objectives. Adopting a longer-term vision for the tax system, 
closely linked to other government objectives, recognises the role that the tax system plays 
in promoting economic growth, employment creation, and development. This also helps to 
guard against frequent, incremental, and crisis-driven reforms, which can undermine the 
sustainability of the tax system (Gordon and Thuronyi 2012). 
 
2.2 The developmental phase 
 
Tax policy proposals in Uganda generally emerge from three sources: (i) research done by 
TPD; (ii) an annual submission from the URA; and (iii) external stakeholders, often in the 
form of ad hoc submissions or appeals. In principle, TPD should analyse the wider economic, 
social, distributional, and welfare effects of all proposals. In practice, this work is often limited 
to estimating the revenue impact, due to both time and resource constraints. During this 
phase, TPD collaborates closely with the URA, factoring their ‘on-the-ground’ experience of 
tax administration, potential loopholes, and developments at the East African Community 
level into policy analysis. Opportunities for other detailed, targeted stakeholder consultations 
are limited, and the potential value of such consultations is generally under-appreciated 
(Wales and Lees 2020). TPD is also frequently asked by senior MFPED officials to analyse 
the feasibility of new revenue proposals in a short timeframe, resulting in responses for which 
the underlying research is often not sufficiently robust. Once proposals have been appraised, 
they are then considered by the senior management of the MFPED. The submissions usually 
include a brief description of the measure, its objective, and the estimated revenue impact. 
 
2.3 The approval phase 
 
Subsequently, the measures approved by the leadership of the MFPED are passed to 
Cabinet. In principle, this gives the Cabinet Secretariat an opportunity to check the quality of 
proposals and carry out a rigorous regulatory impact assessment, including further 
stakeholder consultations and an assessment of other policy options (Wales and Lees 2020). 
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This is intended to sift out proposals for which the evidence is insufficient or improperly 
analysed. In practice, tax proposals are frequently tabled at Cabinet late in the budget cycle, 
compromising the ability of the Secretariat to add significant value. The requirement for a full 
regulatory impact assessment to be completed is often bypassed (Wales and Lees 2020). 
Proposed tax changes usually become public knowledge at this stage. 
 
2.4 The legislative phase 
 
Once approved by Cabinet, legislation is drafted, typically under significant time pressure, 
before the bills are introduced to Parliament for the first reading. A parliamentary committee 
is then appointed to consider the evidence in favour of a proposal, hold hearings to gather 
more information, and feed its recommendations back to members of Parliament (MPs). In 
the plenary sessions, tax issues are usually debated in terms of their revenue-raising 
potential and likely impact on constituents, with less discussion of technical elements (Wales 
and Lees 2020). As stipulated in the Public Financial Management Act, Parliament must 
approve the budget and related bills by 31 May, and these are then passed to the President 
for his assent. 
 
2.5 The implementation phase 
 
Measures typically come into force at the start of the new financial year on 1 July. At this 
stage, the URA often issues guidelines or practice notes explaining how to interpret and 
comply with the new laws. In practice, the short timeline between parliamentary approval and 
implementation can create challenges, particularly where the URA has not had sufficient time 
to develop and introduce new systems or protocols for its staff. Post-implementation review 
is not a formal, scheduled part of the process. Usually, measures are evaluated based on 
their performance against revenue targets, without a detailed assessment of the wider 
consequences of reforms (Wales and Lees 2020). 
 
 
3  The approach to the mobile money tax 
 
3.1 Planning phase: the budgetary background 
 
Despite year-on-year nominal increases in revenue collection achieved by the URA and 
TPD, the consensus in early 2018 was that Uganda’s tax effort remained some way below its 
revenue potential.13 Research conducted during the development of the DRMS14 highlighted 
that, without intervention, tax revenues were unlikely to be able to support Uganda’s growth 
and development ambitions (Government of Uganda 2020). Tax revenue collection, just 
short of 11 per cent of GDP in 2017, lagged behind regional peers (see Figure 3.1). The 
discrepancy between expenditure and revenue was substantial and growing, leaving Uganda 
with a considerable budget deficit of 4.75 per cent of GDP in the financial year 2017/18. This 
increased pressure on the Ugandan Government to borrow funds externally and 
domestically. From 2014 to 2019, Uganda’s debt-to-GDP ratio rose by over ten percentage 
points, while the tax-to-GDP ratio increased by approximately two percentage points 
(Government of Uganda 2020). 
 
 
13 For instance, see World Bank (2018), Langford and Ohlenburg (2016), and Government of Uganda (2020). 
14 The final strategy paper was launched in late 2019 and published in February 2020. However, the process of 
developing this document began in 2017. 
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Figure 3.1 Tax-to-GDP ratios in sub-Saharan Africa (2008 to 2018) 
Note: Each line reflects the tax-to-GDP ratio, which excludes non-tax revenues. ‘SSA’ reflects the average tax-to-GDP ratio 
across sub-Saharan African countries. Source: authors’ calculations with data from the ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government 
Revenue Database (2021). 
 
Against this background, improving domestic revenue mobilisation (DRM) and reducing the 
reliance on debt financing had been identified as priorities by both the GOU and its 
development partners. There was a prominent, high-level political commitment to mobilising 
more tax revenue. The IMF highlighted improved DRM as a key component of its structural 
support programme in Uganda and was frequently encouraging policymakers to ‘expand and 
diversify the revenue base’, in Uganda and beyond (Adegoke 2018). As Moore (2020: 25) 
argues, this is intended as a ‘diplomatic way’ of encouraging governments to reign in tax 
exemptions but is often misinterpreted to mean ‘get more people to pay tax’. Similarly, the 
World Bank dedicated its Economic Update, released in May 2018, to options for raising 
more revenue, particularly noting challenges in tackling informality and capacity constraints 
in tax administration. Uganda has a large informal sector, accounting for over half of all 
economic activity (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2020), which is often identified as a major 
structural constraint to revenue growth.15  
 
Tax policymakers faced pressures from many sides in early 2018. Unanticipated expenditure 
requirements, and the rejection of several revenue-raising tax proposals, created pressure to 
find new sources of revenue late in the budget cycle. In part, the search for new revenue 
sources is a symptom of weaknesses in the budget process. The expenditure side of the 
budget is usually given precedence, without adequately considering the likely tax 
performance in tandem. Without a sufficiently strong and assertive policymaking process, 
these pressures can lead to tax policy changes being pushed through without proper 
examination, to ‘fill a gap’. This certainly seems to have been the case for the mobile money 
tax, which did not feature in TPD’s initial workplan.  
 
3.2 Developmental phase  
 
3.2.1 Policy initiation and motivation 
 
Normally in the Ugandan policymaking process tax measures are driven by the MFPED with 
the close involvement of the URA (see section 2). Unusually, this measure emerged on the 
 




initiative of the President’s Office. On 12 March 2018, the Minister of Finance was sent a 
letter signed by the President, Yoweri Museveni, criticising tax officials for a ‘lack of 
seriousness’ in identifying new sources of tax revenue (The Independent 2018). Among other 
issues, the President documented two concerns relating to the telecommunications sector: (i) 
the lack of excise duties applied to communications over internet platforms and (ii) ‘false 
declarations’ of earnings from telecommunication service providers to reduce their tax 
liabilities (Daily Monitor 2018a). Later, President Museveni wrote on his personal blog that 
the mobile money business is a ‘convenient source’ of revenue, and that ‘telephone 
companies […] have been concealing possible tax sources from the govt [sic] and have been 
aiding tax evasion. They have been hiding the movement of money in and out of the country’ 
(Museveni 2018b). Importantly, the President’s Office does not have a separate policy unit, 
nor does the President have a dedicated advisor on tax policy or revenue matters.16 The 
proposal arose directly from the President’s Office, towards the end of the normal budget 
cycle. This was unprecedented: a senior government official said they had ‘never seen a 
measure introduced in this way’. 
 
Cognisant of budget financing concerns, some prominent politicians appeared to endorse the 
narrative that the telecommunications sector was under-taxed. For instance, during the 
parliamentary debate on this measure, the Deputy Speaker asked MPs to consider whether it 
was ‘okay that this sector is not taxed at all […] that you have transactions going into trillions 
of shillings that are not attracting tax?’ (Parliament of Uganda 2018c: 31). The URA had 
reported that revenues from excise duties on airtime and calls were below targets, and on a 
downward trend as citizens increasingly used apps and internet platforms for calls and 
messaging (Uganda Revenue Authority 2018). It was believed that a tax on mobile money (in 
addition to a tax on social media apps) would increase the overall tax contribution from the 
sector, as well as safeguard revenues as technologies evolved. The Chairperson of the 
Budget Committee highlighted this in Parliament, saying that ‘business is shifting from 
analogue to digital platforms [...] the taxman should equally shift’ (Parliament of Uganda 
2018c: 21). The Parliamentary Finance Committee employed a similar argument, reporting 
that mobile money is an ‘efficiency gain and should be taxed’ and that the measure would 
‘generate more revenue and broaden the tax base’ (Parliament of Uganda 2018b: 13, 14). 
 
It was also argued by the President and politicians that mobile money was a convenient 
mechanism to draw informal sector players into the tax system. The President wrote on his 
blog that the informal sector is ‘never taxed’ and a tax on mobile money would ensure a 
‘modest contribution’ (Museveni 2018a). During parliamentary debates, the State Finance 
Minister for Planning17 said that ‘most of these people who are involved in mobile money 
transactions are not taxed anywhere else. That is where they interact with the economy, they 
are in the informal sector and you can never find them’ (Parliament of Uganda 2018c: 29). It 
was believed that a tax of 1 per cent was small enough to support the budget, without hurting 
the users. 
 
In hindsight, these motivations appear incongruous, as the proposed tax measure would not 
simultaneously tackle all the issues. For instance, while many governments face challenges 
in ensuring that the telecommunications sector pays its fair share (Matheson and Petit 2017), 
the proposed tax was ultimately levied on the consumer. Thus, it was a very indirect and 
over-simplified way to target the providers of mobile money. Inconsistent and contradictory 




16 The President Office’s does have a Presidential Advisory Committee to the Budget (PACOB), but this unit does not 
engage in revenue matters or policymaking. They are more of a lobby group on budget allocations. 
17 The State Finance Minister for Planning is one of four state ministers at the MFPED. They form part of the Top 
Management and report to the Minister of Finance (see Appendix Figure A1 for an organisational chart showing the 
structure of MFPED Top Management). 
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3.2.2 The response from the MFPED 
 
As early as 2016, the President had warned that Uganda would start to take stronger action 
against perceived tax evasion by telecommunications firms (The Independent 2016). 
Technical officials may not have anticipated the extent of the political determination to tackle 
this issue, nor the demand for measures to reduce opportunities for potential tax evasion in 
the informal sector. As the policy direction had been decided at the highest political level, 
policymakers were obliged to follow rather than to lead. 
 
Nevertheless, officials from the MFPED did attempt to produce objective, technical analysis 
to show that the measure, as originally conceived, was unsuitable, and to offer alternatives. 
This analysis appears to have failed to ultimately influence the policy direction. There was a 
strong bias, even in the MFPED, towards securing a new source of revenue, rather than 
determining whether any potential economic and social harms would outweigh the revenue-
generating benefits. While TPD, and the MFPED more generally, has strong technical and 
modelling capacity, there is, in general, a lack of demand from senior officials and politicians 
for this level of analysis to be done. This is recognised in the DRMS, which highlights that tax 
policy has historically been driven by short-term revenue pressures, with limited appetite for 
considering the full economic, distributional and welfare impacts of policy changes 
(Government of Uganda 2020).  
 
Although time was short for the policy development process, various consultations were held 
with the URA, the BOU, and the telecommunications sector to discuss the proposed mobile 
money tax. TPD and the URA worked closely together on revenue estimations, and the 
technical officials were aligned on many issues, including the need to consult the public 
through various civil society organisations and private sector associations. The sector was, 
unsurprisingly, opposed to the measure and attempted to demonstrate its weaknesses. 
However, counterarguments from the MNOs were not seen as especially persuasive or 
compelling. Through the experience of previous changes in fee-based excise duties, officials 
felt that MNOs adjust their tariff structures to compensate for taxes and to safeguard their 
profitability.  
 
Weaknesses in the tax policy process, and insufficient policy analysis, resulted in a flawed 
tax measure being passed to Cabinet and Parliament. As the legislation was initially drafted, 
the tax was imposed four times on a single mobile money payment – depositing, sending, 
receiving, and withdrawing the money were all treated as separately taxable transactions. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates this (mis-)application. The second column shows the assumed tax base 
for an illustrative transfer of UGX 20,000 (US$ 5.40) between two mobile money users. A 1 
per cent transaction tax applied to each of these stages results in an overall tax burden of 
UGX 800 (US$ 0.22). The final column gives an example of the true, additional economic 
value created through a transfer, from the fees levied on the transaction. These fees amount 
to UGX 1,450 (US$ 0.39) in total. A 1 per cent transaction tax thus increased the overall cost 
of this illustrative transaction by 55 per cent. In an effort to be comprehensive, the tax was 
initially applied multiple times to one transaction, seemingly misunderstanding how the 
mobile money industry operates and where profits are made. This misconception arose in 
parliamentary debates as well, where the State Finance Minister for Planning drew a 
comparison between the total annual value of mobile money transactions and Uganda’s 
gross domestic product (Parliament of Uganda 2018c). This comparison seemed to imply 
that the total transaction value equated to a significant source of untapped revenue. 
However, this is really a reflection of the movement of money, rather than the ‘creation’ of 




Figure 3.2 Example of taxes and fees applied to a person-to-person (P2P) transfer 
Tariff sources: MTN Mobile Money tariffs taken in April 2021 (www.mtn.co.ug/insight/mobile-money-tariffs/)  
 
Uganda’s Public Financial Management Act stipulates that the Minister of Finance must 
present tax bills to Parliament for a first reading in the first week of April, and the final budget 
must be approved before 31 May. A political direction emerging on 12 March thus does not 
leave much time for detailed and rigorous analysis. The source of this proposal, as well as 
the sense of urgency given the overall budgetary position, added to its weight. Despite the 
unease of a number of senior officials, the mobile money tax was ultimately included in the 
tax bills (along with the social media tax). The normal policymaking process did not seem 
robust enough to withstand the pressure of the moment. 
 
3.3 Legislative phase: Parliamentary process and debate 
 
Despite the strong reservations of some senior officials from the MFPED, the URA, and the 
BOU, as well as appeals to study the issue further before passing legislation, the measure 
was approved by Cabinet and passed to Parliament. The resulting Excise Duty Amendment 
Bill was first read in Parliament on 3 April, then referred to the relevant parliamentary 
committee for review. After holding hearings with a variety of stakeholders, including the 
URA, civil society organisations, and MNOs, the committee recommended that the Bill be 
passed at the second reading on 30 May, without proposing any amendments to the mobile 
money tax provisions (Parliament of Uganda 2018b). MPs questioned the impact on the poor 
and financial inclusion, as well as the practicality of enforcing the measure, asking whether 
users would be taxed multiple times for one transaction (Parliament of Uganda 2018c: 14, 
29, 30). These concerns were not given satisfactory answers by either the committee 
chairperson or representatives from the MFPED. The Bill was passed without amendments. 
Almost immediately, the Minister of Finance appeared to distance himself from the measure 
and was quoted in the press saying that the tax ‘passed in error’, that the rate should have 
been 0.5 per cent, and that the tax should rather be charged on mobile money providers as 
that is where the revenues lie (Wamala 2018). This is strongly indicative of a split in 
government, chiefly between the technical and the political spheres. 
 
The significant gap between the first and second reading should have provided ample 
opportunity for opposition to mobilise against the proposal. On 3 May 2018, the Civil Society 
Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) began a nationwide campaign against the proposed tax. 
They argued that it would disproportionately affect poorer citizens and that the tax would 
frustrate progress on paying taxes, utilities, and state transfers via digital means (CSBAG 
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2018). These efforts did not rally widespread citizen engagement and the tax proposal 
seemed largely absent from the general public discourse at the time.  
 
As an indication of this, Figure 3.3 shows Google search interest from Uganda in the terms 
‘tax’, ‘mobile money’ and ‘social media’ throughout 2018.18 We include the term ‘social 
media’ as a comparison point, since this tax proposal also drew significant criticism and 
public ire. Google Trends gives the relative popularity of a search query for a defined location 
and time period. The data is indexed to 100, where 100 indicates the maximum search 
interest across the terms, time period, and geographical area.19 We assume that search 
indicators provide representative information about the behaviours of the literate and 
internet-enabled segment of the population (who may be more likely to be mobile money 
users20). There is relatively limited interest in these terms before July, even in May when the 
proposals were discussed in Parliament. Search interest for ‘tax’, ‘mobile money’ and ‘social 
media’ all peak in the week starting 1 July 2018, with another spike in search interest for 
‘mobile money’ in October, correlating to the time of the later amendment. 
 
Figure 3.3 Google Trends: search interest in Uganda (2018) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations using data from Google Trends (2021). 
 
Mobile money providers were notably absent from the public debate at the time, although 
they did lobby Parliament in private. Before the tax was implemented, the only public 
statement from the providers simply indicated which transactions would be taxed from 1 July 
2018 (Reuters 2018b). It is possible that providers, aware that the tax would ultimately fall on 
consumers, had assessed that any subsequent fall in transaction volumes would not 
substantially affect the overall profitability of their mobile money business. Indeed, this 
measure may have been viewed as less damaging than potential alternatives. Mobile money 
providers are also dependent on the government for the renewal of their business licences, 




18 Google Trends data on search terms only captures that exact term, and so the resulting graphs only reflect English-
language searches for these terms. 
19 A score of 100 indicates the week with the most searches for a particular topic, and zero indicates that a given week did 
not have sufficient search volume for the term. 
20 For instance, Riley (2018) shows that adopters of mobile money in Tanzania are typically educated, wealthier, 
urbanised, and younger. 
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3.4 Implementation phase  
 
3.4.1 Public response 
 
There was an immediate public outcry following the introduction of the tax on 1 July, with 
various stakeholders voicing concerns about double taxation, financial inclusion, job losses 
among mobile money agents, and the burden on the poor (Adegoke 2018; Reuters 2018a). 
Civil society organisations, together with journalists, students, and activists, mobilised 
significant protests and demonstrations against the new taxes. The social media tax, which 
was viewed as a form of digital repression and censorship (Boxell and Steinert-Threlkeld 
2019), was the main source of outrage. This had a strong influence on the public perception 
of the mobile money tax, which was protested under many of the same banners. These 
events dominated the headlines domestically and attracted the attention of international 
media. A public opinion survey of nearly 3,000 people conducted in the second week of July 
found that 98 per cent of respondents did not support or were strongly opposed to the mobile 
money tax (Whitehead 2018).21  
 
This period also demonstrates the value that consultation and industry knowledge, as well as 
the practical experience of tax administrators, can bring to policy development. 
Implementation of the mobile money tax was initially difficult and erratic. At first, the tax was 
applied indiscriminately to all mobile money transactions. On 4 July, the URA communicated 
that this was a mistake: the tax should not have been applied to deposits, to transfers from 
personal bank accounts to mobile money accounts, or to the payment of other taxes with 
mobile money.22 This again suggests weaknesses in the policy design process as such 
misunderstanding should have been ironed out in the process of drafting legislation. 
 
The President announced on 4 July that the rate of 1 per cent was gazetted in error and that 
the rate should have been 0.5 cent, and that the tax only applied to withdrawals (Museveni 
2018a). He directed the URA to refund those who had initially paid the tax at the rate of 1 per 
cent. However, the URA was not legally mandated to pay refunds, as, until the new law was 
gazetted in November, transactions were taxed at the legislated rate. This caused further 
confusion and anxiety among citizens as they began to expect refunds which could not be 
provided.  
 
3.4.2 The amendment process 
 
Following the strong public disapproval and pressure, on 12 July the President requested 
that Parliament ‘correct’ the tax measure (Museveni 2018b). The Speaker of Parliament 
urged government officials to expedite an amendment to the Excise Duty Act, to ‘harmonise 
the existing law […] with current demands’ (Parliament of Uganda 2018d). Four days later, 
Cabinet communicated a decision to limit the mobile money tax to withdrawals and to halve 
the rate. The State Finance Minister for Planning reportedly asserted that, despite lowering 
the rate and limiting the number of taxable transactions, the tax would raise UGX 118 billion 
(US$ 32 million), UGX 3 billion more than initially projected (Daily Monitor 2018b). This 
inconsistency cast doubt on the credibility of the methodology used to generate the original 
revenue estimations. 
 
The Finance Minister introduced an amendment in Parliament on 19 July, which was then 
referred to the Finance Committee, who, following parliamentary procedure, had 45 days to 
report back. The committee subsequently consulted with 15 organisations, including 
telecommunications firms and the BOU, who urged Parliament to drop the tax (The Observer 
 
21 The survey was not nationally representative, with a bias towards young, relatively educated people living in the Central 




2018). The committee, however, concluded that the measure was necessary to raise 
revenues to support the budget and recommended that the Amendment Bill be passed. The 
Bill was tabled again in the last week of September, but the vote was delayed as a quorum of 
126 MPs were not present (New Vision 2018). MPs voted on the final Bill on 2 October, and 
it passed with 164 in favour and 124 against. Out of 458 MPs, just 288 were present on the 
day of the vote. The President assented to the new Bill on 25 October and the change was 
implemented from 17 November, once the new law was gazetted.23 
 
3.5 Revenue performance 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the monthly total value and volume of mobile money transactions before 
and after the introduction of the tax. Transaction values initially decline sharply, although they 
show some recovery to pre-tax levels over time. In contrast, transaction volumes rise around 
the introduction of the tax, although this is likely to be driven, at least initially, by the need to 
pay the social media tax with mobile money. Despite this early fall in the total value of 
transactions, and various implementation challenges, the tax was successful with respect to 
its original aim of raising revenue to support the budget. Within six months of implementation, 
the original revenue target for FY 2018/19 of UGX 115 billion (US$ 31.5 million) had been 
reached. In addition, since the burden of collecting the tax was passed on to the mobile 
money providers, this tax is relatively efficient from the perspective of the URA and the 
MFPED, as the cost of collection is fairly minimal. Total revenue collections from the mobile 
money tax in FY 2018/19 were 137 per cent of the original revenue target (Uganda Revenue 
Authority 2019). The divergence between actual collections and the original forecast casts 
some doubt on the validity of the underlying assumptions and suggests that certain issues, 
such as price sensitivity and product substitutability, were not adequately considered in the 
forecasts. These weaknesses were in part due to misconceptions, especially among 
politicians, about how the industry operates, rather than poor modelling capacities within the 
MFPED. 
 
Figure 3.4 Trends in mobile money transaction volumes and values 
Note: The red indicator lines correspond to the introduction of the tax in July 2018 and the implementation of the subsequent 
amendment in November 2018. Source: authors’ calculations with data from the Bank of Uganda (2021). 
 
Over time, collections from the mobile money tax have somewhat stabilised at a lower level. 
Figure 3.5 indicates the performance of the tax measure from July 2018 to November 2020. 





implemented in November. They continued to decline through to February 2019 before 
approximately stabilising. In FY 2019/20 the mobile money tax under-performed relative to 
forecasts, collecting 36 per cent less than in the previous financial year (Uganda Revenue 
Authority 2020). This could indicate that users of mobile money adjusted their transaction 
behaviour to avoid the tax applied to mobile money withdrawals. For instance, customers 
might be avoiding withdrawing by instead using mobile money to pay for goods and services, 
as suggested by the URA (2020).  
 
Figure 3.5 Revenue performance of the mobile money tax, July 2018 to November 2020 
Notes: The marked drop between April and May 2020 corresponds to a very strict lockdown implemented in Uganda to contain 
the spread of COVID-19. Source: authors’ calculations with data supplied by the Tax Policy Department (2021). 
 
 
4  Where did the tax policymaking process 
fail? 
 
The discussion in section 3 has highlighted that several critical steps in the tax policymaking 
process were truncated or missed completely, undermining the process. Figure 4.1 gives a 
summary of the key stages in the development of this measure. One criterion for good 
policymaking is how well one follows the steps that are set out and generally agreed to, 
whether formally documented or according to more informal customs. Against this criterion, 




Figure 4.1 Mobile money tax timeline 
Notes: The descriptions below the line (corresponding to the red dots) refer to deadlines set in the Public Financial Management 
Act.  
Firstly, the policy process was not robust enough to withstand political pressures. In many 
countries, it is not uncommon for politicians to initiate reforms relatively late in the budget 
cycle. However, tax policymaking processes should be sufficiently strong and assertive, 
capable of reacting judiciously to political pressures. In this case, the technical sphere of 
government appeared to succumb, rushing through an inappropriate measure, without a 
proper examination of the issue. The development phase, which usually spans a few months, 
was truncated into about two weeks (see Figure 4.1), undermining the ability of officials to 
develop viable alternatives. Analytical weaknesses were aggravated by the lack of a well-
documented and widely respected tax policymaking process, introducing scope to bypass 
due process. If the approach to tax policy development had been more clearly defined, 
setting out the necessary stages through which policy proposals must pass, this may have 
helped to ensure that all potential issues were more thoroughly examined. 
 
Secondly, tax policymakers failed to give politicians confidence that their concerns were 
being addressed. In part, this could be attributed to the lack of a clear medium-term vision for 
tax policy, which has generally fostered a policymaking environment that is accepting of 
developing short-term measures to plug budgetary gaps. This can result in tax policy feeling 
merely reactive to the pressures of the day with no defined objectives of its own. The process 
of developing a medium-term strategy affords the technical and political sides of government 
an opportunity to voice their respective concerns and agree on a way forward, while ensuring 
that technical officials have sufficient time to study proposals. In the case of this tax, the 
planning phase was almost non-existent, and TPD did not appear to have suitable, 
convincing alternatives ready. In addition, the tax appeared inconsistent with other GOU 
strategies. For instance, the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS), launched in 
October 2017, paid special attention to the importance of mobile money in expanding access 
to financial services. This strategy was referenced in the budget papers, but no mention was 
made about how the new tax might interact with the objectives of the NFIS (Government of 
Uganda 2018b). There is significant potential to link cross-governmental policy priorities 
more coherently. 
 
Thirdly, opportunities to properly incorporate stakeholder views and concerns were missed or 
wasted. While stakeholder consultation in Uganda has room to improve (see Wales and Lees 
2020), it was particularly lacking in this case, in large part due to time pressure. Civil society 
and the private sector were almost entirely excluded during the development phase, despite 
their obvious skin in the game. Stronger consultations, with the right audience, structured 
around specific issues, may have contributed to a better understanding of the likely impact of 
the measure. Such an understanding might have avoided the need for a costly post-
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implementation adjustment. In addition, this might have resolved misconceptions about how 
mobile money operates, possibly avoiding the initial implementation challenges. 
 
That being said, this tax also presents an unusually successful example of tax bargaining, 
the process of implicit or explicit negotiation between taxpayers and government. Public, 
non-institutionalised actors usually have very limited influence on tax policy and do not often 
constitute a coherent interest group capable of rallying around specific issues (Kangave and 
Katusiimeh 2015; Kjær and Ulriksen 2014). In response to widespread protest action, the 
government made an explicit concession to citizens – reducing the tax rate and restricting 
the base, although the social media tax, which was equally if not more unpopular, was 
unchanged. There is a vast literature examining the potential for tax bargaining to build 
citizen-state relationships and improve accountability (for instance, Moore et al. 2018; Moore 
2004; Prichard 2010). However, these benefits are typically conditional on the nature of the 
tax, how the proceeds are spent, and the political and institutional context (Gadenne 2017; 
Meagher 2018; Moore et al. 2018). It remains to be seen whether this mobilisation of civil 
society actors around a specific tax issue has strengthened the ability of citizens to demand 
accountability in the long term. Typically, where actors are restricted to informal, 
uncoordinated, and reactionary bargaining, their efforts are less sustainable (Kangave and 
Katusiimeh 2015).  
 
In the wider context of policymaking in Uganda, this is an example of MFPED’s declining 
ability to counter political forces and tightly control the budget process, analysed in detail by 
Bukenya and Hickey (2019). Public sector management has increasingly been approached 
as a matter of political expediency, with a clear willingness to compromise the integrity of 
proper process. Bukenya and Hickey (2019) suggest that this is a symptom of the ruling 
party’s increased vulnerability at elections and a shift in Uganda’s political settlement towards 
more personalised and populist rule by the President. Relatedly, this measure also highlights 
the declining influence of Uganda’s development partners, who were strongly opposed to the 
tax (see, for instance, the IMF Article IV report (2019) and the World Bank’s Uganda 
Economic Update (2020b)). Donors, especially the World Bank and the IMF, have enjoyed a 
close relationship with the GOU, with a long history of providing considerable support on 
revenue policy (Kjær and Ulriksen 2014; Wales and Lees 2020). Several factors have 
weakened these partnerships, including high-profile corruption scandals triggering the 
temporary suspension of aid, a shift to more project-based aid rather than budget support, 
and stronger relationships with partners such as China, who typically have fewer aid 
conditionalities (Kjær and Ulriksen 2014). Consequently, the GOU have grown more 
selective in their interaction with donors, and donors have lost some influence over certain 
facets of the policymaking process.  
 
 
5  Policy recommendations 
 
5.1 Should the tax be kept, amended further, or repealed? 
 
While the mobile money tax has raised revenues for the GOU, that is just one criterion by 
which to evaluate tax policies. Close to three years on from the introduction of the tax, the 
moment is ripe for a post-implementation review. This would ideally examine the broader 
economic impact of the tax, the equity implications, who it affects, market responses and 
distortions, particularly where similar payment mechanisms are not taxed equivalently, and 
whether it is delivering on its objectives. A review could also consider the efficiency of the 
mechanisms for collection and the broad structure of the tax. There are various options for 
doing this work – outsourcing to academia, through a joint effort, or internally. However, 
without this kind of analysis, one cannot draw holistic conclusions about the effectiveness 
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and the success of the measure. Only with this analysis can recommendations for 
improvement be developed. 
 
5.2 What does good tax policymaking look like? 
 
Policymakers, in Uganda and beyond, might be asking what good tax policymaking would 
look like in similar contexts. From the experience of this tax, we can draw some lessons 
about how to strengthen the policymaking process in general and insulate it against certain 
risks. Here, we highlight several components that, when in place and functioning effectively, 
are likely to produce policy measures that are more nuanced, better understood, more widely 
accepted, and ultimately more successful. 
 
5.2.1 Use a medium-term agenda for tax policy 
 
We have shown that the emphasis on plugging an immediate budget gap contributed to 
weaknesses in policy development. The development and publication of a medium-term 
revenue strategy (MTRS) provides an opportunity to establish the direction of travel for tax 
policy more clearly and rebalance the policy agenda. Publishing a strategy document also 
serves as an anchor for tax policy, allowing outside stakeholders to interrogate more 
effectively any deviations from the government’s stated plan. This also affords an opportunity 
to proactively engage with other parts of government to pursue collaborate policy initiatives 
and ensure that the tax system is aligned with wider policy goals. 
 
5.2.2 Establish and publicise a robust tax policy process 
 
A clearly documented, inclusive, and widely respected tax policy formulation process is a 
powerful defence against interference and short-term thinking. There will inevitably be a 
degree of eleventh-hour work when developing proposals for the revenue side of the budget. 
However, the budgetary calendar is predictable, and the same every year. Tax policymakers 
should aim to schedule the foundational analytical and research work such that the most 
pressing policy priorities can be delivered early. Establishing a timetable for the revenue side 
of the annual budget cycle, and documenting this publicly, commits tax policymakers to a 
standard and systematic approach to all significant policy issues and can make it easier to 
shelve proposals that are handed down too late in the day. In addition, a publicised timetable 
allows stakeholders to be more effectively involved, at the right moment and on precisely 
defined issues. 
 
5.2.3 Adopt rigorous policy appraisal standards 
 
As noted earlier, there is considerable scope for improving the quality of the analysis 
underpinning tax policy proposals. In considering policy options, the focus is often narrowly 
concentrated on the likely revenue impact. Estimating this accurately, for instance by 
incorporating evidence-based assumptions about behavioural changes, is important. 
However, it cannot be the only metric on which to assess proposals. Strong tax policy design 
typically considers a ‘trinity’ of criteria: (i) equity or fairness, reflecting on ability-to-pay; (ii) 
efficiency, ensuring that distortions in economic decision-making are minimised; and (iii) 
administrability, so that taxes imposed can be collected accurately and at low cost (Bird and 
Wilkie 2012). These considerations can inform whether a proposal is, on balance, likely to be 
beneficial or detrimental. Establishing the technical capacity necessary to examine these 
issues sufficiently should be a priority for tax policy units. 
 
A related concern is that the research and analysis carried out to interrogate policy options is 
kept secret, and the rationale and evidence in favour of the final proposals are opaque. This 
damages public trust and confidence in the research done. Publishing more information 
online for public consumption would not only increase transparency, but also incentivise 
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technical officers to produce more rigorous analysis, as the quality and accuracy of their work 
can be more closely scrutinised. 
 
5.2.4 Create a two-way bridge between the political and technical spheres 
 
TPD and URA had not adequately considered messaging from the President in developing 
their plans. Officials should closely follow the political discourse, as well as anticipate 
demands to address certain issues and develop responses early. The links between the 
politicians and the technical departments can be structurally formalised by appointing an 
advisor to sit between the two. This advisor would ideally be well-versed on fiscal policy and 
able to provide the technicians with guidance on policy priorities for the politicians. S/he 
should also be able to help the political sphere, especially ministers in Cabinet, to appreciate 
complex technical issues and arguments. When combined with a well-run policymaking 
process, and good resources capable of producing strong analysis, this is a strong 
mechanism to minimise the disturbance of last-minute political interventions.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Mobile money is widely believed to be a powerful tool for enhancing financial inclusion and, 
potentially, improving the economic well-being of the poor. At the same time, cash-strapped 
governments are increasingly looking for new tax handles to expand their revenue bases. 
While there is little doubt that governments in many low- and lower-middle-income countries 
need to increase tax revenues, policymakers should approach the design of tax measures 
carefully. We have argued that, in the case of the mobile money tax in Uganda, the tax 
policymaking process failed at several stages, leading to the implementation of an ultimately 
flawed and unpopular measure. Widespread opposition to the measure followed its 
implementation, resulting in a period of significant upheaval and confusion. Despite the tax 
generating revenues in excess of what was predicted at the time, it remains controversial. 
 
Uganda is not alone in its concerns about generating more revenues, effectively taxing the 
telecommunications sector, and curbing suspected tax evasion in the informal sector. 
Several other African countries are considering or have experimented with similar taxes on 
mobile money transactions. We believe that this case study offers valuable lessons in 
effective tax policymaking. We have highlighted four areas of the process which, when 
functioning well, can lead to stronger proposals and better outcomes. Firstly, a medium-term 
policy agenda serves to align the political and technical spheres of government and, by 
establishing the vision for tax policy, improves predictability. Secondly, establishing and 
publicising a tax policymaking process reduces the scope for bypassing due process. Thirdly, 
policy appraisal should be standard and prioritised early on, to understand the full likely 
impact of proposals. Finally, formalising links between the political and technical spheres of 
government through the establishment of an advisor can be instrumental in creating broad-







Table A1 Summary of 2018 Excise Duty Amendment Bill 
Category Amendment type Tax rate  
Telecommunications services 
Airtime Redefined tax base to draw parity 
between mobile cellular, landline, 
and public pay phones 
12% of fees charged 
Over-the-top (OTT) services New item UGX 200 per user per day 
of access 
Money transfer or withdrawal 
services (excluding banks) 
Increased tax rate 15% of the fees charged 
(up from 10%) 
Mobile money transactions on 
receiving, payments, and 
withdrawals 
New item 1% of the value of the 
transaction 
Incoming international calls, 
except from Kenya 
Redefined tax base to exclude 
Kenya, Rwanda, and South 
Sudan 
US$ 0.09 per minute 
Banking   
Ledger fees, ATM fees, 
withdrawal fees, and other 
transaction and non-transaction 
charges charged by financial 
institutions 
Increased tax rate 15% of the fees charged 
(up from 10%) 
Alcohol   
Opaque beer New item 30% or UGX 230 per litre, 
whichever is higher 
Spirits Redefined tax base to distinguish 
between undenatured spirits 
made from local or imported raw 
materials; and ready to drink 
spirits 
60–100% or UGX 1,500 to 
2,500 per litre, depending 
on the spirit 
Wine Increased tax rate 20% or UGX 2,000 per litre 
for wine produced from 
local raw materials; 80% or 
UGX 8,000 per litre 
otherwise 
Fuel   
Motor spirit (gasoline) Increased rate UGX 1,200 per litre (up 
from UGX 1,100) 
Gas oil (automotive, light, amber 
for high-speed engine) 
Increased rate UGX 880 per litre (up from 
UGX 780 per litre) 
Other items   
Cooking oil New item UGX 200 per litre 
Motorcycles, at first registration New item UGX 200,000 
Powder for reconstitution to 
make juice 
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